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I.

INTRODUCTION

"[H]ow could it be real when.

. .

it was purely mental?"'

This poignant judicial cry out of the past, which I occasionally
quote to put down my psychiatrist friends, contains the clue to almost all
of the trouble that has attended the development of workmen's
compensation law related to mental and nervous injuries. This equation
of "mental" with "unreal," or imaginary, or phoney, is so ingrained
that it has achieved a firm place in our idiomatic language. Who has not
at some time, in dismissing a physical complaint of some suffering friend
or relative, airily waved the complaint aside by saying, "Oh, it's all in
his head?"
The impact of this pervasive preconception on compensation
decisions can be briefly stated. A high proportion of the cases display a
search for something-anything-that can be called "physical" to
supply the element of "reality" in the injury. If the courts find this
element, they are quite happy to award compensation even though the
injury viewed as a whole is preponderantly mental or nervous. But if no
such "physical" component can be identified, even some of the more
sophisticated appellate courts still find themselves unable to justify
compensation for a work-connected mental or nervous disability.
The cases may be thought of in three groups: (1) mental stimulus
causing physical injury; (2) physical trauma causing nervous injury; and
(3) mental stimulus causing nervous injury. The first two categories are
by now almost universally accepted as compensable. The third is the
battleground where new law, reflecting the increasing ability of medicine
and psychiatry to speak authoritatively on the causes and consequences
* Professor of Law and Director of the Rule of Law Research Center, Duke University
School of Law. A.B. 1931, LL.D. 1953 Augustana College; MA. (Juris.) 1939, D.C.L. 1957,
Oxford University.
1. Hood v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 522,537,209 S.W.2d 345,354 (1948) (Smedley,
J., dissenting joined by Brewster & Folley, JJ.).
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of mental and nervous injury,2 is currently being developed. It must be
understood that the use here of such words as mental, nervous,
emotional, stimulus, psychic, and the like is only a rough expedient
adopted in order to sort out an almost infinite variety of subtle
conditions and relationships for compensation law purposes, and
especially in order to narrow down the range of situations where
controversy seems to persist.
II.

MENTAL STIMULUS CAUSING PHYSICAL INJURY

The first category is that in which a mental, as distinguished from a
physical, impact or stimulus results in a distinct physical injury. Here
the decisions uniformly find compensability.3 There appears to be, on
the law, only one recent contrary holding in the reports A
2.

On the medical aspects of the relation of mental, emotional, and nervous stimuli to

physical illness see the following articles: W.

CURRAN, LAW AND MEDICINE 550-75 (1960); J.
MASSERMAN, PRINCIPLES OF DYNAMIC PSYCHIATRY (2d ed. 1961); R. MEZER, DYNAMIC
PSYCHIATRY IN SIMPLE TERMS (1956); Burtner, Stress, Strain and Trauma of the Heart:
Medical Considerations, NACCA 13TH ANNUAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT 81-109 (1959);
Kornblitt, Cardiac Susceptibility of Lawyers. 6 CURRENT MEDICINE FOR ATTORNEYS 2 (Nov.

1959); Page, Reviews of Leading Current Cases, 28 NACCA LJ. 296 (1961-1962); Rosch,
Stress-Its Relationship with Illness, in 3 TRAUMATIC MEDICINE

&

SURGERY FOR THE ATTORNEY

261 (P. Cantor ed. 1960); Schwartz, Neurosis Following Trauma, I TRAUMA 31 (1959); Wasmuth,
Psychosomatic Disease and the Law, 7 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 34 (1958); Wasmuth, Stress and
Psychosomatic Diseases, in 3 LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA 107 (C. Frankel ed. 1959).
3. For a state by state listing of cases awarding compensation'where a mental impact or
stimulus causes a distinct physical injury see Appendix i.
4. Toth v. Standard Oil Co., 160 Ohio St. 1, 113 N.E.2d 81 (1953). Police suspected that the
employee, a truck driver, was a hit and run driver and questioned him. He submitted to a lie detector
test which the police said indicated he was not telling the truth. He suffered partial paralysis from
cerebral hemorrhage allegedly caused by anxiety and worry resulting from the investigation.
Compensation was denied on the ground that an injury must be physical or there must be a
traumatic damage accidental in character. This is a judicial limitation, since the statute defines
injury as including any injury received in the course of and out of the employment. The dissent said
that this 'was unusual worry over an incident growing out of his employment since the claimed hit
and run death. occurred while he was driving for his employer. The majority, however, said that
worry and anxiety alone do not constitute injury. Cf. McNees v. Cincinnati St. Ry., 90 Ohio App.
223, 101 N.E.2d 1 (1951).
Two recent Pennsylvania cases also leave some doubt as to where that state stands. In Bussone
v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 210 Pa. Super. 442, 234 Ai.d 195 (1967), the claimant suffered a heart attack
durihg an argument with his foreman. The attack was caused by the employee's emotional reaction
to the event, rather than by any physical contact, which was minimal or nonexistent. Compensation
was denied for lack of an accident. In the later case of McGaw v. Bloomsburg, 214 Pa. Super. 342,
257 Ai2d 622 (1969), decedent suffered a fatal heart attack after making an arrest, which appeared
to involve no physical exertion, but possible emotional excitement. Death benefits werc held not
recoverable because there had been no unusual physical exertion. Compare Bussone v. Sinclair Ref.
Co., supra, and McGaw v. Bloomsburg, supra, with Yunker v. Leechburg Steel Co., 109 Pa. Super.
220, 167 A. 443 (1933), and Hunter v. Saint Mary's Natural Gas Co., 122 Pa. Super. 300, 186 A.
325 (1936).
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The easiest type of case in which to connect the stimulus and the

physical injury is that in which the precipitating event is sudden and the
physical result immediate. In this group fall such cases as those involving

a sudden noise or flash resulting in paralysis, heart attack, and the like, 5
accidents or near-accidents precipitating heart attacks or cerebral
hemorrhages,' and assorted other sudden frights accompanied by direct
7
physical consequences.
The result also is clear when the extreme fright or emotional

disturbance, instead of being momentary, is somewhat protracted. Thus,
in Egan's Case,8 the cab driver's ordeal was not a matter of a few

moments. He was stopped by a policeman who was holding three men at
bay with a gun and was asked by the policeman to seek help. At one
point during the episode, the policeman warned one of the men that if the

man did not remove his hands from his pockets he would be shot. The
claimant became very nervous and began to have trouble swallowing and

talking. His cerebral hemorrhage followed a short time later. In this
same category may be mentioned the collapses of employees as the result

of repeated browbeating by a customer, 9 of sustained fear of mob
violence at the United States embassy in Formosa,10 of severe cross-

examination in a personal injury action at which the employee was
testifying in his employer's behalf," of threats by robbers in the course

of a holdup to throw acid in the face of a 60-year-old employee if he did
not surrender the money in his possession,' 2 and of continuing to operate
13
an elevator in a smoke-filled building after a fire had broken out.
The character of the case does not change in kind but only in degree
when the stimulus takes the form of sustained anxiety or pressure leading
5. E.g., Robert v. Dredge Fund, 71 Idaho 380, 232 P.2d 975 (1951); Charon's Case, 321
Mass. 694,75 N.E.2d 511 (1947); Moray v. Industrial Comm'n, 199 P. 1023 (Utah 1921).
6. E.g., George L. Eastman Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 186 Cal. 587, 200 P. 17
(1921); Morotte v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 145 Colo. 99, 357 P2d 915 (1960); Miller v.
Bingham County, 79 Idaho 87, 310 P.2d 1089 (1957); J. Norman Geipe, Inc. v. Collett, 172 Md.
165, 190 A. 836 (1937); Reynolds v. Public Serv. Coordinated Transp., 21 NJ. Super. 528,91 A.2d
435 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952); Geltman v. Reliable Linen &Supply Co., 128 NJ.L. 443, 25 A.2d
894 (Ct. Err. &App. 1942); Pickerell v. Schumacher, 242 N.Y. 577, 152 N.E. 434 (1926) (mem.).
7. E.g., Klein v. Len H. Darling Co., 217 Mich. 485,187 N.W. 400 (1922); Hall v. Doremus,
114 NJ.L. 47, 175 A. 369 (Sup. Ct. 1934); Pukaluk v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 7 App. Div. 2d
676, 179 N.Y..2d 173 (1958); Hunterv. Saint Mary's Natural Gas Co., 122 Pa. Super, 300, 186 A.
325 (1936); Yunker v. W. Leechburg Steel Co., 109 Pa. Super. 220, 167 A. 443 (1933).
8. 331 Mass. 11,116 N.E.2d844 (1954).
9. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
10. In reTruit, No. 61-131 (Employees Compensation App. Bd., May 11, 1961).
11. Church v. Westchester County, 253 App. Div. 859, 1 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1938).
12. In re Weiner's Case, 345 Mass. 761, 186 N.E.2d 603 (1962).
13. Schwartz v. Hampton House Management Corp., 14 App. Div. 2d 936, 221 N.Y.S.2d
286 (1961).
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to a heart attack or cerebral hemorrhage. One of the leading cases in this
group is Klimas v. Trans CaribbeanAirways, Inc.," decided by the New

York Court of Appeals in 1961. The story reads like the typical tragedy
of a modern executive struggling with the impossible strains of highpressure competition and high-level personal frictions. The decedent was
the director of maintenance and engineering of Trans Caribbean
Airways. He was only 33 years old and had no history of heart disease.
In November 1955, because of corrosion on one of the wings of a Trans
Caribbean plane, the damaged plane was grounded by the CAA and
taken to Texas for repairs. The president of the corporation blamed the
decedent's negligence for this damage. At a Christmas party the
president, in the presence of the decedent's associates, made no secret of
this belief or of the fact that there would be trouble for the decedent if the
plane were not fixed by the end of February. This set the decedent off on
a frantic series of trips to speed up the repair work in Texas and to try to
find replacement parts in California, parts which he finally obtained
from an airline in Oklahoma. February came and went, and on March 7,
1956, the chief pilot turned up in Texas expecting to fly the plane back,
only to find that the repair process was not even close to completion. On
the same day, the decedent got a repair bill totaling 266,000 dollars. He
turned white, according to the chief pilot. He wrote a letter to his wife,
saying he felt "as if it's my money I'm spending." The pressure
continued to mount. For three days the decedent struggled to get the bill
reduced, until he told his wife he was on the verge of engaging in physical
violence with the man on the other side of the negotiations. He also told
her the president was going to "blow his stack." He got orders to stay in
Texas two more days, made an agitated phone call to the vice president,
and shortly thereafter suffered a myocardial infarction.
The Board made an award; the Appellate Division reversed; and the
Court of Appeals, with three dissents, reinstated the award, clearly
recognizing that compensation may be awarded for physical injuries
resulting from emotional strain.
The dissent opens with this statement:
This is an unprecedented decision. I have not found anywhere a holding by a New
14. 10 N.Y.2d 209, 176 N.E.2d 714, 219 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1961), revg 12 App. Div. 2d 551,
207 N.Y.S.2d 72 (1960). See Schwartz v. Hampton House Management Corp., 14 App. Div. 2d
936, 221 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1961); Schwartz v. Robin Hats, Inc., 9 App. Div. 2d 972, 193 N.Y..2d
689 (1959); Pukaluk v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 7 App. Div. 2d 676, 179 N.YS.2d 173
(1958); Krawczyk v. Jefferson Hotel, 278 App. Div. 731, 103 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1951); Church v.
Westchester County, 253 App. Div. 859, I N.YS.2d 581 (1938); Pickerell v. Schumacher, 242
N.Y. 577, 152 N.E. 434 (1926). See also Antonini v. Progressive Electronics, 15 App. Div. 2d 842,
224 N.YS2d 481 (1962), and other emotional heart attack cases in IA A. LARSON. ThE LAW OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 38.64(a) (1967).
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York appellate court that anxiety and worry associated with employment constitute
without more an accidental injury justifying an award of workmen's compensation
because the injury and anxiety has caused physical deterioration., 5

This is a curious statement. It would be nearer the mark to say, as the
summary of authorities above indicates, that there is not to be found
anywhere a case not holding as the Klimas case holds-with one or two
exceptions. The selection of the particular words "anxiety and worry,"
rather than "fright" or "excitement," may help to explain the
statement. But what was it that the man experienced whose brakes failed
as he was rolling backward, if not anxiety and worry in concentrated
form?-and this grounded an award in 1926.16 What brought on the
heart attack of the employee testifying at his employer's trial 7 and of the
cook watching the fight between co-employees,' 8 if not worry and
anxiety? Evidently what the dissent really wanted, but did not quite say,
was that the anxiety and worry should be neatly crammed into a very
short period of time. But here, as in compensation law generally, 9 there
is no real validity to this distinction between sudden and protracted
injuries.
Among other decisions in accord with the Klimas case are the
following: the exhaustion of an overworked claims adjuster which
brought on angina pectoris;20 the stroke and paralysis of a negotiator as
a result of 65 days of tension;' the cerebral thrombosis of a deputy
commissioner of insurance as the result of job pressures;2 the heart
attack of a woman with preexisting hypertension when her accounts did
not balance; 23 and the heart attack of an employee who became
emotionally upset over clerical errors in his office. 4
Against this backdrop the Toth25 case from Ohio stands out as
distinctly out of line. It is odd that Ohio insists on reading into the
statute a limitation to injuries that are physical or traumatic with no
statutory compulsion to do so, since the statute includes any injury
15.
16.
17.
18.

10 N.Y.2d at 216, 176 N.E.2d at 717-18, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
Pickerell v. Schumacher, 242 N.Y. 577, 152 N.E. 434 (1926).
Church v. Westchester County, 253 App. Div. 859, 1 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1938).
Krawczyk v. Jefferson Hotel, 278 App. Div. 731, 103 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1951).
19. SeeA. LARSON, supra note 14, at § 39.
20. Hoage v. Royal Indem. Co., 90 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
21. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 39 Cal. 2d 831, 250 P.2d
148 (1952).
22. Insurance Dep'tv. Dinsmore, 233 Miss. 569, 102 So. 2d 691 (1958).
23. Coleman v. Andrew Jergens Co., 65 NJ. Super. 592, 168 A.2d 265 (Essex County Ct. L.
Div. 1961).
24. Little v. J. Korber & Co., 71 N.M. 294,378 P.2d 119 (1963).
25. For a discussion of Toth v. Standard Oil Co., 160 Ohio St. 1, 113 N.E.2d 81 (1953), see
note 4 supra.
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received in the course of and arising out of the employment. Even by

Ohio's own terms, however, there is certainly physical injury enough to
suit anyone in a cerebral hemorrhage resulting in partial paralysis. The

injury must be understood to embrace the total episode from start to
finish. By contrast, Idaho starts out with a statute" that limits recovery
to injury by violence to the physical structure of the body. Nevertheless,
Idaho had no difficulty in awarding compensation for a cerebral
hemorrhage that occurred eight hours after the claimant underwent an
emotional strain when he nearly collided with a car containing several
childrenY The Ohio decision is made more perplexing by the fact that
only two years before Toth Ohio had produced a decision in the McNees
case" placing it squarely in the mainstream of compensation law on this
topic.
It is quite another matter to arrive at a denial of compensation in
this type of case on grounds other than limitations imposed by the
concept of injury. One such ground is the failure to satisfy conventional

tests of "by accident" or "arising out of the employment," as when the
emotional strain is no greater than that of everyday life.2 The other
familiar ground is simple inadequacy of evidence of causal connection

between the mental, emotional, or nervous stimulus and the physical
result.
26. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-201 (1949).
27. Miller v. Bingham County, 79 Idaho 87,310 P.2d 1089 ((57).
28. McNees v. Cincinnati St. Ry., 90 Ohio App. 223, 101 N.E.2d 1 (1951).
29. See Coleman v. Guide-Kalkhoff-Burr, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 857, 178 N.E.2d 912, 222
N.Y.S.2d 689 (1961) (holding that the emotional strain on a proofreader with a heart condition who
got into 2 short arguments was no greater than countless irritations to which all workers
occasionally are subjected without untoward results); Santacroce v. Fortieth W. 20th St., Inc., 10
N.Y.2d 855, 178 N.E.2d 912, 222 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1961) (holding heart failure not compensable in
spite of contention that failure was precipitated by emotional strain of employee's argument with a
superior); Samolin v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 20 App. Div. 2d 160, 245 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1963)
(denying compensation for heart attack caused by argument between claimant and foreman on
ground that this was not an "accident").
In In re Korsun's (Dependent's) Case, 354 Mass. 124, 235 N.E.2d 814 (1968), the decedent
found an empty liquor bottle in his desk. He started yelling at some other employees, telling them
that he was afraid he would lose his job if the boss found out about it. Shortly thereafter, the decedent began to suffer the symptoms of a heart attack and later died. Although Massachusetts
awards compensation for disability resulting from fright or emotional shock, the court held that in
this case emotional strain over the prospects of losing one's job did not arise out of the "nature,
condition and obligations, or incidents of the employment," and therefore that the death was not
compensable.
30. Amaral's Case, 341 Mass. 133, 167 N.E.2d 493 (1960) (holding no causal connection
between the death of a taxicab driver caused by ruptured blood vessels in the esophagus, and the
shock caused by his hitting 2 schoolgirls, killing one and injuring the other); Campbell v. ColgatePalmolive Co., 134 Ind. App. 45, 184 N.E.2d 160 (1962) (affirming denial ofcompensation benefits
based on conflicting medical testimony of emotional upset as cause of fatal coronary occlusion);
Harley v. War Dep't, F.S.A., No. 48-95 (Employees Compensation App. Bd., Apr. 20, 1949)
(finding no medical proof of connection between overwork and ulcers).
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It is worth noting in this connection that even tort law, which does
not carry with it the beneficent and remedial character of compensation
law, has recognized the propriety of damages when the defendant's
negligence creates mental disturbance that in turn produces physical
injury." For example, a father while looking out of a window saw a large
truck crash through the basement of his house. His fright and concern
for the safety of his small boys who were then in the basement, as well as
32
for his own safety and that of his house, led to physical illness.
Similarly, liability was recognized when a driverless truck crashed into
the side of a house near the bedroom where decedent was sleeping with
the result that his terror produced a fatal heart attack.33,

IIII.

PHYSICAL TRAUMA CAUSING NERVOUS
INJURY

It is now uniformly held that the full disability including the effects
of the neurosis is compensable when there has been a physical accident
or trauma 'and the claimant's disability is increased or prolonged by
traumatic neurosis, conversion hysteria, or hysterical paralysis. Dozens
of cases, involving almost every conceivable kind of neurotic, psychotic,
depressive, or hysterical symptom or personality disorder, have accepted
this rule.Y Thus, compensation has been awarded when, after all the
physical effects of a fall of rock on claimant's shoulder had cleared up,
complete paralysis of one arm, attributable entirely to hysteria,
remained.3 The same result was reached when a woman got an electric
shock in her arm while ironing and lost the use of the arm due to a
36
neurotic condition.
There is almost no limit to' the variety of disabling "psychic"
conditions that have already been recognized as legitimately
compensable'-con.ditions which not many years ago would have
received little understanding or recognition on the part of the courts. For
example, in a New York case, the claimant was bitten by a cat and
developed a psychoneurotic fear of rabies, for which he was
31. Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134,50 N.W. 1034 (1892).
32. Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933).
33. Collav. Mandella, I Wis. 2d 594,85 N.W.2d 345 (1957).
34. For a state by state listing of cases holding that when there has been a physical accident or
trauma and claimant's disability is increased or prolonged by traumatic neurosis, conversion
hysteria, or hysterical paralysis, the full disability including the effects of the neurosis is
compensable see Appendix II.
35. American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 59 Ariz. 87, 123 P.2d 163 (1942).
36. Leev. Lincoln Cleaning & Dye Works, 145 Neb. 124,15 N.W.2d 330 (1944); cf. Garvinv.
Philadelphia Transp. Co., 173 Pa. Super. 15, 94 A.2d 72 (1953) (compensation was terminated on
showing of no loss of earnings in spite of a similar neurosis).
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compensatedY In a Maryland case, the claimant was compensated after
being disabled by a neurasthenia in the form of a conviction that his
backbone, which had been injured, was relentlessly decaying., Florida
granted compensation for a neurosis that occurred when a slight blow on
the head activated the claimant's memory of the accidental death of her

son from a head injury."
A striking but by no means unusual type of condition is represented
by a Louisiana case 0 in which the claimant, who had been a "chipper,"
suffered a shoulder injury when the scaffold upon which he had been

standing collapsed. Some months later, while working in an unrelated
employment, he picked up a "chipper gun," held it for about three or
four minutes, and then threw it down. Immediately, he suffered a
reaction which induced temporary blindness and vomiting. An award of
total and permanent disability was affirmed.
As in other compensation areas, a preexisting weakness in the form
of a neurotic tendency does not lessen the compensability of an injury
that precipitates a disabling neurosis." Thus, when an employee had
previously suffered from schizophrenia, the precipitation of a recurrence
of this mental disease by a severe heat stroke was held a compensable
personal injury.42 Those cases denying compensation generally have done

so not on the theory that traumatic neurosis is not compensable as
such,4 but either on the ground that the evidence failed to establish a
37. Kalikoffv. Lucas & Co., 271 App. Div. 942, 67 N.Y.S.2d 153, affd, 297 N.Y. 663,76
N.E.2d 324 (1947).
38. Bramblev.Shields, 146 Md. 494, 127 A.44 (1924).
39. Watson v. Melman, 106 So. 2d 433 (Fla. Ct. App. 1958).
40. Ladner v. Higgins, Inc., 71 So. 2d 242 (La. Orleans Ct. App. 1954).
41. Tatman v. Provincial Homes, 94 Ariz. 165, 382 P.2d 573 (1963) (while only 10% of
claimant's total disability from mental disorder attributed to employment accident, total disability
benefits awarded for aggravation of a preexisting condition); Subsequent Injuries Fund v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 53 Cal. 2d 392,348 P.2d 193, 1 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1960) (preexisting schizophrenic
condition sufficiently severe to classify employee as disabled person within meaning of the
Subsequent Injuries Fund statute); Old King Mining Co. v. Mullins, 252 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. 1952)
(preexisting neurosis aggravated by bump on head held compensable); Farran v. Curtis Publishing
Co., 276 Pa. Super.92, 193 A. 117 (1937); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Gladney, 335 S.W.2d
792 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (award sustained where claimant hospitalized for schizophrenic reactions
of a paranoid type in spite of allegations that such conditions were caused by lifelong process
rejected).
In Meador v. Industrial Comm'n, 2 Ariz. App. 382,409 P.2d 302 (1966), the claimant returned
to his old job, but was later released because the employer felt he could no longer perform his
assigned work. A psychiatric report stated that the claimant had hypochondriacal tendencies, and
for this reason the Commission denied recovery, stating that the claimant had fooled his employer
as to his physical condition. Denial of benefits was held to be error, since the employer must take the
employee as it finds him.
42. Jacobson v. Department of Labor & Indus., 224 P.2d 338 (Wash. 1950).
43. Cf Streeter v. New England Box Co., 106 N.H. 146, 217 A.2d 423 (1965) (denying
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causal connection between the injury and the neurosis, 44 or on the ground
that there was no disabling neurosis at all.4 5 For example, in a Colorado

case,4" a seventeen-year old boy, after amputation of three fingers, had

been unable to get dates, was cross with his brothers, argued with his

mother, and insisted that he was "grown up." It was held that such
difficulties were the natural biological developments of a teenager and

not traumatic neurosis. The award was limited to the schedule loss.
IV.

MENTAL STIMULUS CAUSING NERVOUS INJURY

In each of the above two categories, there is something to satisfy the
old-fashioned legal insistence upon something "physical." A few cases,

however, have appeared in a third category involving a mental or
emotional stimulus resulting in a primarily "nervous" injury.
Cases in this third category are quite evenly divided on the issue of

compensability.4 7 As in the first category, the fact situations include as
stimulus both sudden fright and protracted stress. Among the sudden

fright cases, 48 Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood" is one of the pioneers.
It is reminiscent of the case of the "chipper," discussed above, who was
recovery when impartial medical expert testified that claimant's alleged disability was posttraumatic neurosis).
44. For a state-by-state survey of cases denying compensation on the ground that the evidence
failed to establish a causal connection between the injury and the neurosis see Appendix Ill.
45. See Koch v. Industrial Comm'n, 70 Ariz. 283, 219 P.2d 773 (1950) (denying
compensation for conversion hysteria following trauma was based entirely on the absence of
disability); Corral v. Crawford Homes, Inc., 113 So. 2d 820 (La. 1st Cir. Ct. App. 1959) (accepting
the compensability of traumatic neurosis under Miller v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 99 So.
2d 511 (La. 2d. Cir. Ct. App. 1958), the court nevertheless held that the conclusions of medical
witnesses based on the assumption that claimant was sincere could rightly be held inadequate to
demonstrate a true neurosis when the court thought the claimant was insincere in his claims of
symptoms of back and leg pain); Erwin v. L. & H. Constr. Co., 192 Pa. Super. 632, 161 A.2d 639
(1960) (discontinuing compensation benefits on medical testimony that claimant's vision had
improved to 20/50 in spite of his allegations that a blow on the head resulted in restrictive vision
which, when superimposed upon his previous neurotic personality, set into motion a psychoneurotic
reaction with conversion features).
46. Industrial Comm'n v. Saffeels, 150 Coio.41,371 P.2d438 (1962).
47. For a survey of the case law on this point see Appendix IV.
48. See Lyng v. Rao, 72 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1954); Simon v. R.H.H. Steel Laundry, 25 NJ.
Super. 50,95 A.2d 446 (Hudson County Ct. L. Div.), affd, 26 NJ. Super. 598,98 A.2d 604 (Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1953); Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 254 Tex. 430,279 S.W.2d 315 (1955); Yates
v. South Kirkby &Collieries, Ltd., [1910] 2 K.B. 538; cf.Shivers v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 75 Ga.
409,43 S.E.2d 429 (1947) (where a woman who alleged that after a particular explosion she suffered
a nervous collapse from persistent fear of another such explosion was denied compensation on the
ground that the alleged explosion had in fact never taken place); Hackett v. Travelers Ins. Co., 195
So. 2d 758 (La. 3d Cir. Ct. App. 1967). Contra, Bekeleski v. O.F. Neal Co., 141 Neb. 657, 4
N.W.2d 741 (1942); Liscio v. Makransky & Sons, 147 Pa. Super.483, 24 A.2d 136 (1942).
49. 147Va.204, 13S.E.2d291 (1941).
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felled by the associations attending a chipper gun.0 In the Hagood case,
the claimant was violently frightened by. an electric flash caused by a
short circuit in a motor about fifteen feet from her. She fainted and
began to fall but was caught by a co-employee. As a result of the
association thus created, the next time she happened to see this coemployee, she promptly fainted again. Compensation was awarded since
it was impossible for her to work because of this neurosis.
There are, in addition, several decisions confirming the
compensability of a disabling nervous condition brought on gradually
by strain and worry.s' A clean-cut illustration is the Michigan case of
Carter v. General Motors Corp.5 Here we have the modern industrial
tragedy, not at the executive level, but at the level of the assembly line,
with a set of facts recalling Charlie Chaplin's losing battle with this
inhuman antagonist in Modern Times. The claimant, who had
considerable emotional trouble in his background, simply could not
keep up with the assembly line, as a result of which he found himself
constantly berated by his foreman. This in turn filled him with dread of
losing his job, and the final result was a disabling psychosis. The
Supreme Court of Michigan upheld an award.
Probably the most significant case yet to appear on the subject of
"nervous" injury is the Texas decision in Bailey v. American General
Insurance Co.s The claimant and another workman were on a scaffold
when one end gave way. The other workman, in sight of the claimant,
plunged to his death. The claimant thought he himself was about to be
killed, but he was caught in the cable and did not fall. He managed to
jump to the roof of another building. After this experience, he tried to
resume his employment, but, although he had trained for it all his life
and was considered one of the better structural steel workers, he could
not continue. He had periods of "blanking out"; once he literally
"froze," undergoing complete paralysis when trying to work at a height;
he had trouble sleeping and experienced violent nightmares; his blood
pressure was affected; he became hypersensitive to pain; he had a tremor
of the eyelids; and his reflexes were underactive.
This, then, was a perfect example of the category of mental shock
causing "nervous" injury. What makes the Bailey case especially
noteworthy is the fact that the award was made under a statute defining
50. Ladner v. Higgins, Inc., 71 So. 2d 242 (La. Orleans Ct. App. 1954).
51. See American Nat'l Red Cross v. Hagen, 327 F.2d 559 (7th Cir. 1964); In re John T.
Wade, No. 61-122 (Employees Compefisation App. Bd., May 9, 1961); Carter v. General Motors
Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960).
52. 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960).
53. 154Tex.430,279S.W.2d315 (1955).

1970]

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

1253

"injury" as "damage or harm to the physical structure of the body."
The Supreme Court of Texas met this issue head-on, by stating at the
outset: "The question here is: Has Emery Eugene Bailey suffered
damage or harm to the physical structure of his body?" The court gave
an unqualified answer of "yes" to this question, reversing the Court of
Civil Appeals. In supporting its conclusion, the court, in effect, said:
look at this man's symptoms; obviously his body no longer functions
properly; therefore, can you say as a matter of law that a body which no
longer functions properly has suffered no harm to its physical structure?
The physical structure is not just bones and tissues considered as if they
were mechanical objects; it is the entire interrelated, living, functioning
organism. The opinion is valuable both for its analysis of the precedents
from all jurisdictions, and for its well-reasoned, up-to-date analysis of
the real nature of injury.
The net result is that, if other jurisdictions would follow this lead,
the categories into which this article divides the cases could and should
be reduced by combining "mental stimulus causing physical injury,"
and "mental stimulus causing nervous injury," since there is no really
valid distinction between physical and "nervous" injury. Certainly
modern medical opinion would support this view and insist that it is no
longer realistic to draw a line between what is "neryous" and what is
"physical." It is an old story in the history of law to observe legal theory
constantly adapting itself to accommodate new advances and knowledge
in medical theory. Perhaps in earlier years, when much less was known
about mental and nervous injuries and their relation to "physical"
symptoms and behavior, there was an excuse, on grounds of evidentiary
difficulties, for ruling out recoveries based on such injuries, both in tort
and in workmen's compensation. But the excuse no longer exists.
Consequently, a state that would withhold the benefits of workmen's
compensation from a man who, before an obvious industrial mishap,
was a competent, respected iron-worker, and after the mishap was
totally incapacitated to do the only job for which he was trained, would
nowadays be doing unjustifiable violence to the intent of the workmen's
compensation act, for reasons that are without support in either legal or
medical theory. If Texas can reach this result under its "physicalstructure" definition, then a fortiori states having no such statutory
hurdle should be expected to find protection under their laws for this
very real kind of injury.
Unfortunately, at this writing, the Court of Appeals of New York
has been unable, in spite of a golden opportunity, to accomplish this
simple step into the twentieth century. The story begins with Chernin v.
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ProgressService Co.Y The majority of the court of appeals held that the
evidence did not support a finding that a taxicab driver sustained an
accidental injury when he developed paranoid schizophrenia after his
taxicab struck a pedestrian. The court specifically reserved opinion on
whether an occurrence "which causes psychological trauma may in any
case be compensable even though there was no physical injury." Next
came Straws v. Fail.55 The claimant, on his employer's orders,
accompanied a sick co-worker to a hospital in a taxicab. The co-worker
died en route in the claimant's arms. The claimant suffered
psychological disablement for a year, including headaches, dizziness,
weakness, pain, nausea, and insomnia. The appellate division held that
"mental injury precipitated by mental cause provided no basis for an
award of disability benefits." The claim was denied.
The court of appeals on February 21, 1963, refused to review
Straws v. Fail.This refusal rounded out a regrettable series of accidents
of timing in the interplay between the three decision-making levels in
New York. First, a majority of the Workmen's Compensation Board
rejected the Straws claim on the authority of the appellate division's
decision in the Chernin case. Later the court of appeals, in affirming the
Chernin case, expressly left open the compensability of a nervous injury
caused by mental stimulus, as indicated in the quotation from the
opinion cited above. Next, the appellate division decided the Straws
case-but in so doing completely ignored the court of appeals
reservation on this point, and instead cited the appellate division's own
Chernin opinion, although the court of appeals had affirmed on a
different ground. As a result, the application for review of the Straws
case arrived in the court of appeals with adverse decisions in both the
Board and appellate division, decisions which were made without
reference to the court of appeals' express indication that the mentalcause-mental-result issue was open. At this point, it would have been a
simple matter for the court of appeals to set matters straight once and
for all. Instead, it adopted the perplexing course of refusing to review the
Straws case, thus deliberately perpetuating the very uncertainty it had
declared to exist in the Chernin opinion.
It might be a good thing to remind our appellate courts from time
to time that, under a system of law made up in large degree of case
decisions, the building up of a reasonably complete body of law often
depends on the accident of whether a suitable set of facts gets into
54.

9 N.Y.2d 880, 175 N.Eld 827 (1961).

55.

17 App. Div. 2d 998,233 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1962).
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appellate litigation. When a perfect opportunity to clear up an important
unsettled point does at last happen to come along-as it did in the
Straws case-the refusal of the court of last resort to discharge its
decisional responsibility is inexcusable. How long will it be before
another clean-cut case of mental stimulus creating mental injury reaches
the court of appeals? In the meantime, the court has left the bar, the
claimants, the defendants and, not least, the writers of articles and texts
with an indefinite period of confusion, since the last express word from
the court of appeals (in Chernin) is that the point is undecided.
It is difficult to see why the New York courts in 1963 should be
indecisive about a concept that the King's Bench accepted without
difficulty in 1910,51 and that Texas in 1955 was able to embrace even
under the handicap of statutory language requiring "damage or harm to
the physical structure of the body." A statement going to the heart of
this entire question occurs in the opinion in Indemnity Insurance Co. of
North America v. Loftis.5 7 The court said:
The human body consists of bones, flesh, ligaments, and nerves, controlled by the
brain. The law does not state which of these particular elements must produce the
disability. If a disability exists, whether or not it is psychic or mental, if it is real and
is brought on by the accident and injury, this being a humane law and liberally
construed, it is nevertheless compensable.1

The device of leaning on any tiny evidence of bones-flesh-andligaments injury as a crutch to avoid standing up to the true issue is
wearing thin. The claimant in Watson v. Melman, Inc. received a slight
tap on the head, and because of reactivation of memories of her son's
death she was brought down by a disabling neurosis. Yet what, in
reality, was the injury? The physically innocuous blow? Suppose she had
been almost hit on the head by a force a hundred times as great and the
same memories had been reactivated. Should compensation have been
denied because of the absence of actual contact with flesh or bone? Once
more it is necessary to belabor the obvious, which is that the injury is to
be understood as the effect of the total episode from first to last on the
total organism, including brain and nervous system.
V.

"COMPENSATION NEUROSIS"

The most provocative mental-injury question is that of the
compensability of "compensation neurosis." "Compensation
56. Yates v-South Kirkby & Collieries, Ltd., [1910] 2 K.B. 538.
57. 103 Ga.App.749,751,120S.E.2d655,656 (1961).
58. Jd.at751, 120S.E.2dat656.
59. 106So.2d433 (Fla.App. 1958), cert. denied, 111 So. 2d40 (Fla. 1959).
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neurosis," which must be distinguished from conscious malingering,
may take the form of an unconscious desire to obtain or prolong
compensation, or perhaps of sheer anxiety over the outcome of
compensation litigation. In either case a genuine neurosis disabling the
claimant is produced.
Of the comparatively small number of cases that have been
reported, a majority accept the compensability of genuine compensation
neurosis.60 In Hood v. Texas Indemnity Insurance Co.,"' for example,
where both sides of the case were well presented in the majority opinion
and in the three-judge dissent, the controlling medical testimony was to
the effect that the claimant's disability would probably clear up as soon
as the litigation was over, but that he was for the time being genuinely
disabled by a neurosis caused in part by an "unconscious desire for
compensation." The majority awarded compensation on the theory that
this unconscious desire was only one contributing cause of the neurosis,
and its presence was not fatal to the award since the injury need not be
the sole cause of the disability. The dissent, on the other hand, viewed the
neurosis as an independent intervening cause. Awards have been made
on somewhat similar testimony in Washington, 2 where the court said,
"[c]lassifying his case as a 'desire neurosis' it is still traumatic in
origin," and in Minnesota," where the medical testimony was that if the
case could be settled and the claimant gotten back to work, his limp
would disappear. Some support in principle for this view may be found
in a New York case 64 which held compensable a case of dementia
praecox caused in part by the workman's brooding over delay in
receiving compensation payments.
On the other hand, some cases have denied compensation for
neurosis attributable to an unconscious desire for compensation. In one,
the claimant, who had already received one compensation award and
recovered, relapsed into paralysis because of the "defense reaction" of
producing the symptoms which previously had brought compensation."
In another, nervous symptoms caused by anxiety over pending
compensation litigation and uncertainty of continuance of payments
were held to be an independent cause and not compensable. 5
60.
61.
62.

For a survey of case law on this point see Appendix V.
146 Tex. 522,209 S.W.2d 345 (1948).
Peterson v. Department of Labor &Indus., 178 Wash. 15, 33 P.2d 650 (1934).

63.

Welchlin v. Fairmont Ry. Motors, 180 Minn. 411, 230 N.W. 897 (1930).

64. Rodriguez v. New York Dock Co., 256 App. Div. 875, 9 N.YS.2d 264, leave to appeal
denied, 280 N.Y. 852,20 N.E.2d 398 (1939).
65. Swift & Co. v. Ware, 53 Ga. App. 500, 186 S.E. 452 (1936).
66. Kowalski v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 116 Conn. 229, 164 A. 653 (1933).
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As a matter of compensation theory, the cases awarding
compensation are better reasoned, since, assuming that the anxiety over
compensation and the accompanying neurosis are genuine, the line of
causation from the original injury to the present disability is unbroken.
The denial of compensation is probably dictated less by causation theory
than by a fear that the extremely fine line between malingering and
"compensation neurosis" cannot as a practical matter be successfully
drawn. In any case, it will not do in these times to brush aside such
claims by asking the question with which this article began: "[H]ow
could it be real when, as shown by Dr. Cline's testimony, it was purely

mental

.

..

?',67

While it lasts, the neurotic mental disability is as real

as any other disability and, in the absence of evidence of malingering, is

as much a personal injury."
The phrase "in the absence of malingering," however, opens up one

of the most elusive fact-finding difficulties in the law of workmen's
compensation-or in the law of personal injuries generally, for that
matter. Great pains have been taken here to stress that mental injury is
real; it must by the same token be stressed that malingering is real. A
considerable number of reported cases show denials of compensation

attributable to the finding of malingering or its equivalent; 6 a
substantial number reject the allegation of malingering, sometimes with

a trace of diffidence. 0 The number of legal guidelines that can aid in this
problem is limited, but several may be briefly noted.
67, Hood v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 522, 209 S.W.2d 345 (1948) (Smedley, J.,
dissenting joined by Brewster & Folley, JJ.).
68. "To nullify the commission's right to take into consideration claimant's fear and anxiety
as a proper basis of award of compensation is to deny claimant's right to establish the existence of a
very real injury. Fear and anxiety constitute as great an influence on human behavior and health as
is known to either psychology or medicine, and in this case was not merely a subjective mental
symptom." National Lumber & Creosoting Co. v. Kelly, 101 Colo. 535, 539, 75 P.2d 144, 146
(1937).
69. For a survey of case law on this point see Appendix VI.
70. American Compressed Steel Corp. v. Blanton, 357 S.W.2d 888 (Ky. 1962) (traumatic
neurosis compensable); Joseph v. Southern Pulpwood Ins. Co., 140 So. 2d 725 (La. 3d Cir. Ct. App.
1962) (holding that evidence that the 29-year old man maintained an adulterous relationship and
had been in jail for drinking and fighting did not discredit the medical testimony that he was not
malingering); Doucet v. Ashy Constr. Co., 134 So. 2d 665 (La. 3d Cir. Ct. App. 196 1); Williams v.
Bituminous Cas. Corp., 131 So. 2d 844 (La. 2d Cir. Ct. App. 1961); Sims v. Times-Picayune
Publishing Co., 128 So. 2d 444 (La. 4th Cir. Ct. App. 1961) (compensation awarded since the fact
that claimant suffered 3 compensable injuries in a short period "refutes any suspicion of
malingering [but] might create the impression and suspicion that the plaintiff suffers from
'compensationitis' "); Istre v. Molbert Bros. Poultry & Egg Co., 125 So. 2d 436 (La. 3d Cir. Ct.
App. 1961); Reyer v. Pearl River Tung Co., 219 Miss. 211, 68 So. 2d 442 (1953) (majority denied
compensation deeming it unnecessary to go into the question of traumatic or compensation
neufrosis, whereas the dissent felt such compensation neurosis was a question of fact within the sole
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The one unquestionably reliable statement on the topic, which may
serve as a basic text, is that "the line between neurosis and malingering
is not always sharply defined."" Having put this understatement on the
record, one next may suggest that, in drawing this difficult line, a heavy
burden should be upon the party that alleges malingering. This rule has
been strongly stated by the Louisiana court: "The courts will stigmatize
a claimant as a malingerer only upon positive and convincing evidence
justifying such a conclusion. 7 2 There are several reasons for such a rule.
One is that a mistaken inference here works a particularly severe
hardship, for if the claimant is in fact genuinely disabled, he suffers the
double blow of being deprived of compensation and of being publicly
labeled a liar and a cheat. Another is the pervading remedial character of
the legislation. Still another is the imperfect state of medical knowledge
in many of the fields here involved, in spite of spectacular advances in
recent decades. This consideration was given full and sympathetic
attention by the Mississippi court in Reyer v. Pearl River Tung Co. 3
Here, although the doctor who treated the claimant attributed her
condition to a neuritis, a neurologist could find no neurological disease
that would prevent the claimant from working. Neither doctor could
account for her pain. At the same time, neither doctor would controvert
the fact that she had pain. The court, in reversing a denial of
compensation, said:
The fact of disability by reason of pain, therefore, exists. The inability of doctors to
put their fingers on the exact physical cause should not result in casting the claim
overboard. With all of the knowledge now possessed by the great medical

sometimes the diagnosis of
profession, it is a matter of common knowledge that
7
human ailments baffles the greatest medical minds.

Sometimes a supposed malingering case can be disposed of by
intensifying the search for a medical cause, as in a New York case in
which the Board's own medical examiner found that the claimant was
indeed suffering from a mild permanent partial back injury. 75 Usually,
province of the Commission); Montclair v. Griffith, 19 App. Div. 2d 918,243 N.Y.S.2d 963 (1963)
(question of hysterical neurotic reaction or malingering settled by Board medical examiner's
testimony that the claimant was suffering from a mild permanent partial back injury); Foster v.
Daystrom Furniture, Div. Daystrom, Inc., 18 App. Div. 2d 745, 235 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1962) (the
Board did not find the claimant was malingering, although the employer's doctors had a different
opinion of the cause of claimant's slow recovery). •
71. American Compressed Steel Corp. v. Blanton, 357 S.W.2d 888, 889 (Ky. 1962).
72. Istre v. Molbert Bros. Poultry & Egg Co., 125 So. 2d 436,440 (La. 3d Cir. Ct. App.
1961).
73. 219 Miss. 211, 68 So. 2d 440 (1953).
74. Id. at217,68 So.2d at442.
75. Montclair v. Griffith, 19 App. Div. 918,243 N.Y.S.2d 963 (1963).
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however, the issue comes down to the presence of responsible conscious
volition on the part of the claimant to invent, protract, misrepresent, or
exaggerate his complaint. At one end of the spectrum is the true victim
of conversion hysteria, helpless in the grip of a condition he cannot
control. At the other end is the true malingerer, the kind of which the
Louisiana court said, employing a term not in Stedman's Medical

Dictionarybut still plain enough: "The court believes this plaintiff is a
faker."7"
In between are cases in which all kinds of mixtures of neurosis and
"cussedness" occur, leaving the psychiatrists and fact-finders with the
unenviable task of sorting out which is the really operative fact. Thus, in
another Mississippi case, it was found that a claimant, who had a history
of neurotic tendencies in childhood, "simply seized on a minor accident'
as an excuse to express (his neurosis) in pain and other physical
symptoms."77 Compensation was accordingly denied, on the ground that
the accident did not in fact cause, precipitate, or aggravate the
psychoneurosis. In an Arizona case, a specialist in neuropsychiatry
testified that no psychiatric disability was attributable to the accident
and that the psychogenic factors were not related to the accident.
Rather, he testified, "I would pinpoint it [the claimant's condition] as a
poor frame of mind toward his disability which the man has elected to
adopt."" Compensation was denied. A similar line of testimony on
attitude toward work was decisive in a Florida case. It was found that
the claimant had suffered all his life from a personality weakness
described as "markedly passive dependent" and that the trauma
produced an anxiety from which he could escape using a "defense
mechanism of hysteria." In other words "the claimant's problem was
not an inability to work, but rather a lack of desire to work," which
would be overcome if he were placed under great stress or pressure.79
Compensation was again denied.
In the last analysis, the problem of malingering is one of fact, which
must be left to the skill and experience of medical and psychiatric
experts, and of compensation administrators, who usually manage in
time to develop considerable facility in detecting malingerers at the factfinding level.
76.

Lyons v. Maryland Cas. Co., 158 So. 2d 392,393 (La. 3d Cir. Ct. App. 1963).

77.

International Paper Co. v. Wilson, 243 Miss. 659,672, 139 So. 2d 644,649 (1962).

78. Minton v. Industrial Comm'n, 90 Ariz. 254, 256, 367 P.2d 274, 276 (1961). See also
Davidson v. Industrial Comm'n, 72 Ariz. 314,235 P.2d 1007 (1951).
79. Johnny's Welding Shop v. Eagan, 142 So. 2d 470,472 (Fla. 1962).
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CONCLUSION

Compensation law's record of keeping legal remedies abreast of
medical advances in the handling of mental and nervous injury has been,
on the whole, a reasonably good one. As we have seen, if there is any
element of the "physical" present, either in the cause or in the effect,
compensability is the virtually universal rule. Against the rather oldfashioned clinging to some shred of the "physical" in these cases must
be balanced the fact that, once this shred has been found, awards issue
that require recognition of some of the most sophisticated theories of the
interaction of mind and body and of some of the most complex neurotic
conditions including "compensation neurosis." As to the category of
%.mentalstimulus causing nervous injury, with no "physical"
involvement, although the cases are now sharply divided, the strength of
the trend toward coverage suggests that the time is perhaps not too far
off when compensation law generally will cease to set an artificial and
medically unjustifiable gulf between the "physical" and the "nervous."
The test of existence of injury can then be greatly simplified. The single
question will be whether there was a harmful change in the human
organism-not just its bones and muscles, but its brain and nerves as
well.
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Appendix I
Following is a listing, by jurisdiction, of cases awarding compensation where a
mental impact or stimulus causes a distinct physical injury.
Federal: Hoage v. Royal Indem. Co., 90 F.2d 387, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 736,
(1937) (exhaustion of overworked claims adjuster brought on angina pectoris); In re
Truit, No. 61-131 (Employees Compensation App. Bd., May 11, 1961) (heart attack as
result of fear during mob violence at United States embassy in Formosa).
California: Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 241 P.2d
299 (Cal. App. 1952), affd, 39 Cal. 2d 831,250 P.2d 148 (1952) (65 days of tension while
negotiating labor contract caused "stroke" and paralysis); George L. Eastman Co. v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n, 186 Cal. 587, 200 P. 17 (1921) (excitement caused truck
driver's heart attack).
Colorado: Marotte v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 145 Colo. 99,357 P2d 915
(1960) (compensation awarded because the emotional strain of being in an automobile
accident was found to have precipitated a policeman's heart attack, and killing a garter
snake two days later aggravated the condition).
Idaho: Miller v. Bingham County, 79 Idaho 87, 310 P.2d 1089 (1957) (recovery
allowed where cerebral hemorrhage occurred 8 hours after claimant narrowly averted a
collision with an automobile carrying several small children); Roberts v. Dredge Fund,
71 Idaho 390, 232 P.2d 975 (1951) (cardiac arrest resulting from shock to nervous
system when deceased heard a loud noise and witnessed a large ball of fire 4 feet in
diameter caused by an electrical short occurring during the replacement of a fuse held
sufficient to satisfy the "violence-to-the-physical-structure" requirement).
Maryland: J. Norman Geipe, Inc. v. Collett, 172 Md. 165, 190 A. 836 (1937)
(compensation allowed for paralysis brought on by driver's excitement in attempting to
avoid accident).
Massachusetts: Egan's Case, 331 Mass. 11, 116 N.E.2d 844 (1954); see text
accompanying note 8 supra, In re Weiner's Case, 345 Mass. 761, 186 N.E.2d 603 (1962)
(recovery allowed for total disability following heart attack suffered by 60-year-old
employee who, on his way to make a bank deposit, was accosted by 2 men threatening to
throw acid in his face if he did not surrender the money); Charon's Case, 321 Mass. 694,
75 N.E.2d 511 (1947) (compensation awarded for paralysis caused by fright when
lightning blew out 3 motors near claimant with a loud noise and startling flash of light).
Michigan: Klein v. Len H. Darling Co., 217 Mich. 485, 187 N.W. 400 (1922)
(accidentally causing co-worker's death led to fatal shock).
Mississippi: In Insurance Dep't v. Dinsmore, 233 Miss. 569, 102 So. 2d 691, affd
on rehearing, 104 So. 2d 296 (1958), the cerebral thrombosis of a 60-year-old deputy
commissioner, with preexisting high blood pressure, was held causally related to
pressures of job. The majority said: "It seems unthinkable that, if hypertension may be
aggravated either by physical or mental and emotional exertion, courts should be willing
to accept the physical as causative, but reject, as not accidental, a disability, proximately resulting from mental and emotional exertion." Id. at 579, 102 So. 2d at 694.
New Jersey: Geltman v. Reliable Linen & Supply Co., 128 NJ.L. 443, 25 A.2d
894 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942) (heart attack caused by fright at being forced to side of road
while in automobile held compensable); Hall v. Doremus, 114 NJ.L. 47, 175 A. 369
(Sup. Ct. 1934) (recovery allowed for skull fracture suffered by a worker who fainted as
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the result of witnessing a particularly difficult delivery of a calf); Reynolds v. Public
Serv. Coordinated Transp., 21 NJ. Super. 528, 91 A.2d 435 (App. Div. 1952) (recovery
allowed for cerebral hemorrhage of bus driver as result of excitement following minor
collision); Coleman v. Andrew Jergens Co., 65 N.J. Super. 592, 168 A.2d 265 (Essex
County Ct. 1961) (heart attack of woman with history of hypertension and family
troubles held compensable as related to her emotional disturbance when her accounts did
not balance).
New Mexico: Little v. J. Korber & Co., 71 N.M. 294,378 P.2d 119 (1963) (heart
attack suffered when employee became emotionally upset over clerical errors in his office
held compensable).
New York: Klimas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 209,176 N.E.2d
714, 219 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1961), rev'g 12 App. Div. 2d 551, 207 N.Y.S.2d 72 (1960),
discussed in Page, Reviews of Leading Current Cases, 28 NACCA L.J. 296, 297-312
(1961-1962); Pickerell v. Schumacher, 242 N.Y. 577, 152 N.E. 434 (1926) (cerebral
apoplexy resulted from claimant's fright when his vehicle rolled backwards and the
emergency brake failed); Schwartz v. Hampton House Management Corp., 14 App. Div.
2d 936, 221 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1961) (recovery based solely on the psychic trauma without
requiring a finding of an original physical trauma was allowed to the claimant who
continued to operate an elevator in a smoke-filled, burning building for subsequent
massive hemorrhage of an ulcer-especially since an ulcer is a "'classical'
psychosomatic disease"); Schwartz v. Robin Hats, Inc., 9 App. Div. 2d 972, 193
N.Y.S.2d 689 (1959) (medical testimony supported a causal connection between the
emotional condition and the heart attack occurring after the employee had a dispute with
his employer); Pukaluk v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 7 App. Div. 676, 179 N.Y.S.2d
173 (1958) (heart attack resulted from cleaning woman's fright at entrance of
"intruder" who turned out to be forelidy); Krawczyk v. Jefferson Hotel, 278 App. Div.
731, 103 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1951) (fatal heart attack of cook resulted from watching a fight
between 2 co-employees); Church v. Westchester County, 253 App. Div. 859, 1
N.Y.S.2d 581 (1938) (employee testifying at employer's trial had coronary occlusion as
result of excitement). See also Antonini v. Progressive Electronics, 15 App. Div. 2d
842, 224 N.Y.S.2d 481 (1962); IA A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION,

§ 38.64(a) (1967).

Ohio: McNees v. Cincinnati St. Ry, 90 Ohio App. 223, 101 N.E.2d 1 (1951)
(charge that mere mental strain or worry is not an injury within the meaning of the
compensation law was prejudicial error where trolley driver died from coronary
thrombosis after severe mental strain and excitement while driving in a dense fog); see id.
at 275, 101 N.E.2d at 5 (Hurd, J., concurring). But cf Toth v. Standard Oil Co., 160
Ohio St. 1,113 N.E.2d 81 (1953).
Oregon: In Kinney v. State Indus. Accident Comm'n, 245 Ore. 543,423 P.2d 186
(1967), the claimant had aortic stenosis, but it was asymptomatic until he underwent the
stress and strain of trying to help another employee who was caught in an elevator shaft.
As a result, he became disabled, although there was no additional damage to the heart.
The court held that actual physical damage or harm was not required and awarded
compensation. In reaching its decision, the court inferentially approved the analogous
cases awarding compensation for nervous injury caused by mental stimulus.
Pennsylvania: Hunter v. Saint Mary's Natural Gas Co., 122 Pa. Super. 300, 186
A. 325 (1936) (heart failure due to fright when dog jumped on back of gas man in cellar);
Yunker v. Leechburg Steel Co., 109 Pa. Super. 220, 167 A. 443 (1933) (heart failure
from fright while splinter being removed).
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Texas: Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) (customer's
berating of laundry employee caused stroke).
Utah: Moray v. Industrial Comm'n, 58 Utah 404, 199 P. 1023 (1921) (loss of
vision resulted from hysteria at electric flash).
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Appendix II
Following is a listing, by jurisdiction, of cases awarding compensation for
traumatic neurosis, conversion hysteria, or hysterical paralysis when claimant's
disability resulted from a physical accident or trauma and the neurosis complicated or
prolonged the disability.
Federal: Travelers Ins. Co. v. McLellan, 302 F. Supp. 351 (E.D.N.Y. 1969)
(recovery allowed f6r psychiatric disability to claimant who developed an occupational
loss of hearing, causing him to lose his job and resulting in traumatic conversion
hysteria); Jarka Corp. v. Hughes, 196 F. Supp. 442 (E.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd on other
grounds, 299 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1962) (claimant sought recovery under the
Longshoremen's Act for personality disorder with conversion reaction, memory
impairment, and increased frequency of convulsions following a head injury).
Arizona: Vance v. Industrial Comm'n, 94 Ariz. 142,382 P.2d 557 (1963) (award
that was limited to 15% physical functional disability reversed on evidence of greater
functional overlay, partial paralysis, caused by conversion hysteria); Murray v.
Industrial Comm'n, 87 Ariz. 190, 349 P.2d 627 (1960) (award solely for physical
disability reversed to permit inclusion of disability resulting from traumatic psychoneurosis); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Gilbert, 68 Arz. 202, 203 P.2d 870 (1949); American
Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 59 Arz. 87, 123 P.2d 163 (1942). But cf
Parnau v. Industrial Comm'n, 87 Ariz. 361, 351 P.2d 643 (1960) (additional
compensation denied for a change in conditions due to degeneration of ftinctional or
psychoneurotic conditions, rather than organic causes immediately related to injury to
the upper vertebrae). See also Hatfield v. Industrial Comm'n, 89 Ariz. 285,361 P.2d 544
(1961) (denial of compensation remanded for finding on disabling conversion hysteria).
Colorado: Arvas v. McNeil Coal Corp., 119 Colo. 289; 203 P.2d 906 (1949);
National Lumber & Creosoting Co. v. Kelly, 101 Colo. 535, 75 P.2d 144 (1937).
Delaware: Fiorucci v. C.F. Braun & Co., 54 Del. 79, 173 A2d 635 (1961) (claim
remanded for consideration of claimant's post-surgical neurosis).
Florida: Bryant v. Elberta Crate & Box Co., 156 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 1963)
(psychiatric evaluation to determine if the claimant's disability, "functional overlay,"
might be lessened-thus possibly creating an improved condition which would warrant
surgery-was improperly denied); Matera v. Gautier, 133 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1961) (10%
psychiatric disability added to 30% functional disability sustained a total disability
award); Watson v. Melman, Inc., 106 So. 2d 433 (Fla. App. 1958), cert. denied, Ill So.
2d 40 (Fla. 1959) (discussed in text accompanying note 59, supra).
Georgia: Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Archer; 108 Ga. App. 563, 134 S.E.2d 204
(1963) (benefits continued during residual psychic disability); Indemnity Ins. Co. of N.
America v. Loftis, 103 Ga. App. 749, 120 S.E.2d 655 (1961) (denial of claim for
disability of a "psychic nature" reversed when neurosis arose from a physical injury).
For a case in which the causal sequence runs from physical to mental and back to
physical see Employers Ins. Co. v. Wright, 114 Ga. App. 10, 150 S.E.2d 254 (1966). The
claimant was awarded benefits for disability due to physical injury caused by rape,
although at the time of the award, the disability had ceased. Later, she again became
disabled when the emotional trauma of the rape caused preexisting physical disabilities
to worsen. Additional compensation was awarded.
Idaho: Skelly v. Sunshine Mining Co., 62 Idaho 192, 109 P.2d 622 (1941) (when
neurosis comes some time after original injury, it is compensable as change in condition).
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Illinois: Ford Motor Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 357 111.401,192 N.E. 345 (1934).
Indiana: E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Green, 116 Ind. App. 283,63 N.E.2d
547 (1945).
Kansas: Hayes v. Garvey Drilling Co., 188 Kan. 179, 360 P.2d 889 (1961) (total
and permanent disability award for aggravation of preexisting traumatic neurosis
following serious accident); Morris v. Garden City Co., 144 Kan. 790, 62 P.2d 920
(1936) (injured foot plus neurosis justified award of total disability).
Kentucky: Ricky Coal Co. v. Adams, 426 S.W.2d 464 (Ky. 1968) (holding that
dormant conversion hysteria "brought alive" by a back injury could be considered a
condition or disease, and therefore part of the liability should have been apportioned to
the Special Fund); E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Whitson, 399 S.W.2d 734 (Ky.
1966) (recovery for total disability allowed to claimant who was injured by an explosion
and later was forced to cease work because of severe pain resulting from conversion
reaction rather than any physical injury); Holland v. Childers Coal Co., 384 S.W.2d 293
(Ky. 1964) (temporary total disability compensation awarded until recovery from
psychosomatic condition triggered by minor compensable injury); High Splint Coal Co.
v. Jones, 338 S.W.2d 208 (Ky. 1960) (back injury leading to anxiety and neurosis);
Eastern Coal Corp. v. Thacker, 290 S.W.2d 468 (Ky. 1956).
Louisiana: Cripps v. Urania Lumber Co., 213 So. 2d 353 (La. 3d Cir. Ct. App.
1968) (denial of compensation held to be error where the only positive medical testimony
indicated that claimant sustained a subdural hematoma, traumatic neurosis, or
aggravation of a chronic schizophrenic condition as a result of a work-connected
accident); Goodley v. Brunet, 150 So. 2d 804 (La. 2d Cir. Ct. App. 1963); Deboest v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 138 So. 2d 646 (La. 3d Cir. Ct. App. 1962) (total permanent
disability caused by neurosis following a moderately severe lumbosacral strain was held
compensable); Guidry v. Michigan Mut. Liab. Co., 130 So. 2d 513 (La. 3d Cir. Ct. App.
1961) (recovery allowed where back injury aggravated a preexisting congenital
spondylolysis and the possibility of recurring injury resulted in a traumatic or hysterical
neurosis); Whitfield v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 125 So. 2d 165 (La. 4th Cir. Ct. App.
1960) (award for traumatic neurosis following hernia operation); Patke v. Firemen's
Fund Indem. Co., 119 So. 2d 859 (La. Orleans Cir. Ct. App. 1960) (claimant's posttraumatic neurosis evidenced by pain, fear of working on scaffolds and a general fear of
recurring injuries held compensable); Spurlock v. American Auto Ins. Co., 101 So. 2d
766 (La. Orleans Cir. Ct. App. 1958) (award sustained where inability to move fingers
was attributable to actual physical disability or employee's sincere belief that his other
fingers were disabled); Miller v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 99 So. 2d 511 (La.
2d Cir. Ct. App. 1957) (conversion hysteria compensable); Ladner v. Higgins, Inc., 71
So. 2d 242 (La. Orleans Cir. Ct. App. 1954); Peavy v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber
Co., 40 So. 2d 505 (La. 2d Cir. Ct. App. 1949); Wilkinson v. Dubach Mill Co., 2 La.
App. 249 (2d Cir. Ct. 1925).
Maryland: Bramble v. Shields, 146 Md. 494, 127 A. 44 (1924).
Massachusetts: Hunnewell's Case, 220 Mass. 351,107 N.E. 934 (1915).
Michigan: In Johnson v. Vibradamp Corp., 381 Mich. 388, 162 N.W.2d 139
(1968), the claimant suffered a compensable hernia, and although he was released by his
physician to return to work, the employer would not reinstate him. As a result, the
claimant developed a functional overlay with regard to a previous back condition and
became unable to return to work. Functional overlay was held to be a compensable
disability. Redfern v. Sparks-Withington Co., 353 Mich. 286, 91 N.W.2d 516 (1958)
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(conversion hysteria compensable); Harris v. Castile Mining Co., 222 Mich. 709, 193
N.W. 855 (1923) (neurasthenia compensable).
Minnesota: Hartman v. Cold Spring Granite Co., 243 Minn. 264,67 N.W.2d 656
(1954) (traumatic neurosis from cumulative effect of several injuries and corrective
surgery compensable).
Missouri: Cebak v. John Nooter Boiler Works Co., 258 S.W.2d 262 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1953) (compensation allowed for neurosis and Parkinsonism directly resulting
from head injury).
Montana: Sykes v. Republic Coal Co., 94 Mont. 239,22 P.2d 157 (1933).
Nebraska: Haskettv. National Biscuit Co., 177 Neb. 915, 131 N.W.2d 597 (1964)
(total permanent disability award made for back injury which failed to improve due to
emotional tension resulting from the original accident); Dietz v. State, 157 Neb. 324, 59
N.W.2d 587 (1953) (neurosis following blows on the head compensable); Lee v. Lincoln
Cleaning & Dye Works, 145 Neb. 124, 15 N.W.2d 330 (1944).
New Jersey: Moccia v. Eclipse Pioneer Div. of Bendix Aviation, 57 N.J. Super.
470, 155 A.2d 129 (App. Div. 1959) (compensation allowed for "severe anxiety neurosis
with depression associated with a chronic dermatitis affecting at various times all parts
of [claimant's] body"); Smith v. Essex County Park Comm'n, 15 N.J. Misc. 227, 190
A. 45 (Workmen's Comp. Bur. 1937) (neurosis partly accentuated by economic
conditions unrelated to injury).
New Mexico: In Webb v. Hamilton, 78 N.M. 647, 436 P.2d 507 (1968), the
claimant had previously lost the sight of his left eye, and in an industrial accident injured
his right eye, resulting in partial loss of sight. As a result of the injury, the claimant
-became nervous and emotionally upset, causing depressive reaction neurosis, personality
changes, and a tremor in his right arm. New Mexico provides that although loss of both
eyes constitutes total disability, in the event the loss of vision in one eye occurred before
the compensable accident, benefits are limited to the schedule amount for loss of vision in
one eye. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-18.A (1960). The court held that since the emotional
aspects of injury had left claimant totally disabled, the limitation did not apply, and he
was entitled to full benefits for permanent total disability. Gonzales v. Gackle Drilling
Co., 70 N.M. 131, 371 P.2d 605 (1962) (the shock or traumatic neurosis resulting from
accidental severance of a leg could support award not limited to the scheduled benefits).
New York: Knief v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 30 App. Div. 2d 748, 291
N.Y.S.2d 463 (1968) (award of benefits for permanent total disability allowed to
claimant having a predisposition towards a disabling mental state, when a wrist injury
precipitated conversion hysteria, causing permanent total disability); Munsie v. DiFiore,
19 App. Div. 2d 916, 243 N.Y.S.2d 988 '(1963) (compensation allowed for death from
delirium tremens caused by an industrial, accidental trauma and contributed to by
intoxication); Pokorny v. Chadbourne, Wallace, Parkes & Whiteside, 14 App. Div. 2d
662, 219 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1961) (compensation awarded for conversion neurosis for 10
years following an injury to the stenographer's thumb); Russo v. Art Steel Co., 14 App.
Div. 2d 605, 218 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1961) (recovery allowed for post-traumatic neurosis
following head injuries from an explosion); Trgo v. Harris Structural Steel Corp., 13
App. Div. 2d 856, 214 N.Y.S.2d 791 (1961) (compensation awarded for traumatic
neurosis, anxiety reaction, and depressive reaction following a brain concussion);
Edmonds v. Kalfaian &Son, Inc., 9 App. Div. 2d 551, 189 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1959) (award
granted claimant who suffered a compensable arm amputation in 1941 and was later
committed to a mental institution on the basis that the arm injury was a factor in the
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eventual mental breakdown); Chicklowski v. Hotel Syracuse, Inc., 5 App. Div. 2d 704,
168 N.YS.2d 641 (1957); Griffiths v. Shaffrey, 283 App. Div. 839, 129 N.Y.S.2d 74,
aff'd, 308 N.Y. 729, 124 N.E.2d 339 (1954) (manic-depressive psychosis held
compensable, since truck collision with train contributed to claimant's breakdown);
Underwood v. Whitney, 282 App. Div. 783, 122 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1953) (compensation
awarded to window-washer who, subsequent to healing of fracture, complained of
stomach disorders that caused physical pain interfering with his ability to work);
Wallace v. Bell Aircraft Co., 276 App. Div. 800, 93 N.Y.S.2d 162 (1949) (functional
neurosis in form of stagger after blow on head); Kalikoffv. John Lucas & Co., 271 App.
Div. 942, 67 N.Y.S.2d 153, affd, 297 N.Y. 663, 76 N.E.2d 324 (1947). For another
mental-physical-mental sequence, comparable to that in Employers Ins. Co. v. Wright,
114 Ga. App. 10, 150 S.E.2d 254 (1966) (discussed under Georgia in this appendix), see
Daugherty v. Midland Painting Co., 14 App. Div. 2d 961, 221 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961). The
employee sustained a fractured skull and brain injury from a compensable accident. He
died from an infectious ruptured gall bladder while confined in a mental hospital. The
doctors testified that due to his mental condition, he had been unable to feel the pain or
indicate his suffering to the hospital attendants in time for proper medical attention. The
death from the rupture infection was held compensable.
Ohio: Statev. Industrial Comm'n, 83 Ohio L. Abs. 114, 165 N.E.2d 211 (Sup. Ct.
1960) (compensation awarded to claimant for time lost while being treated for nervous
condition on finding that back condition and nervousness were either due to or
aggravated by the injury).
Oklahoma: Wade Lahar Constr. Co. v. Howell, 376 P.2d 221 (Okla. 1962);
Rialto Lead & Zinc Co. v. State Indus. Comm'n, 112 Okla. 101,240 P. 96 (1925).
Pennsylvania: Redrick v. Knapp Bros. Co., 127 Pa. Super. 92, 193 A. 117
(1937); Farran v. Curtis.Publishing Co., 276 Pa. 553, 120 A. 544 (1923).
Rhode Island: Greenville Finishing Co. v. Pezza, 81 R.I. 20,98 A.2d 825 (1953)
(employee entitled to full rate for total disability resulting from traumatic neurosis
following enucleation of eye); Imperial Knife Co. v. Calise, 80 R.I. 428, 97 A.2d 579
(1953) (award of partial compensation to claimant incapacitated by a "fear complex"
from doing light work offered her by her employer affirmed); Wareham v. United States
Rubber Co., 73 R.I. 207, 54 A.2d 372 (1947); cf. Fox Point Chem. Co. v. Pacheco, 91
R.I. 106, 161 A.2d 207 (1960) (although court stated that claimant might be suffering
from incapacitating psychoneurosis after full orthopedic recovery, further compensation
denied on ground that the specific back injuries set out in the agreement were no longer
disabling).
South Carolina: Kennedy v. Williamsburg County, 242 S.C. 477, 131 S.E.2d 512
(1963) (total disability from paranoid schizophrenia condition following head injuries
held compensable).
Tennessee: Buck & Simmons Auto & Elec. Supply Co. v. Kesterson, 194 Tenn. 90,
250 S.W2d 39 (1952) (total disability awarded for neck injury followed by traumatic
neurosis).
Texas: City of Austin v. Crooks, 343 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd on other
grounds, 162 Tex. 189, 346 S.W.2d 115 (1961) (total permanent disability benefits were
awarded to city employee who suffered physical disabilities and psychoneurosis from
reaction to tetanus antitoxin and horse serum administered after he was bitten by a dog);
Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Slusser, 110 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
Washington: Jacobson v. Department of Labor & Indus., 224 P.2d 338 (Wash.
1950).

19701

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

1269

Appendix III
Following is a listing, by jurisdiction, of cases denying compensation on the ground
that the evidence failed to establish a causal connection between the injury and the
neurosis.
Arizona: Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 46 Ariz. 162, 49 P.2d 391
(1935).
Kentucky: State Highway Dep't v. Hopwood, 331 S.W.2d 900 (Ky. 1960)
(compensation denied to claimant who alleged neurosis from head injury sufficient at the
time to knock him momentarily unconscious); Powell v. Winchester Garment Co., 312Ky. 38, 226 S.W.2d 341 (1950).
Louisiana: Brown v. Ceco Steel Prods. Corp., 136 So. 2d 161 (La. 4th Cir. Ct.
App. 1962) (evidence that claimant's backache complaints were caused by urethritis and
that he was able to work at other jobs without complaint substantiated a finding that he
was not suffering from a traumatic neurosis); Litton v. London Guar. & Accident Co.,
133 So. 2d 858 (La. 2d Cir. Ct. App. 1961) (a single, 90 minute visit to a psychiatrist 3
days before the trial was insufficient background evidence to justify award based upon
neurosis); Lambert v. Wolf's, Inc., 132 So. 2d 522 (La. 3d Cir. Ct. App. 1961) (claimant
denied compensation for post-traumatic neurosis on evidence that impotency, worry
about his income and welfare assistance payments, hostility toward his employer, and
concern that various doctors could find nothing physically wrong were also precipitating
factors); Morgan v. Farnsworth & Chambers, Inc., 119 So. 2d 576 (La. Ist Cir. Ct. App.
1960) (compensation denied to claimant whose fall of 3 stories caused no broken bones,
in spite of psychiatrist's testimony that the claimant had developed a partial sexual
impotence and conversion reaction).
Maryland: Greene v. Yeager, 222 Md. 411, 160 A.2d 605 (1960) (compensation
denied on ground that residual pain was due to general nervous disposition rather than
due to effects of injury).
Minnesota: Zobitz v. City of Ely, 219 Minn. 411, 18 N.W.2d 126 (1945).
Missouri: In Smith v. Cascade Laundry Co., 335 S.W.2d 501 (Kansas City, Mo.
Ct. App. 1960), claimant alleged that impairment of use of her right arm because of an
anxiety-hysteria neurosis was caused because her job in the laundry required immersion
of her right hand in a "sour" solution causing her hand to become red and swollen. The
court denied the claim on evidence that the same solution had been used by other
employees for many years without ill effects, thus indicating that no causal relation
existed between the solution and her neurosis. Patane v. Stix, Baer & Fuller, 326 S.W.2d
402 (St. Louis, Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (psychoneurosis that did not appear until a year after
a blow on the head was not causally related to the blow).
New Hampshire: Condiles v. Waumbec Mills, 95 N.H. 127,58 A.2d 726 (1948).
New York: Krasinski v. American Brass Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 827,209 N.Y.S.2d
335 (1961) (additional benefits denied to claimant who, 4 years after an award for
traumatic neurosis terminated, was hospitalized for paranoia not caused by injury);
McWilliams v. Eastman Kodak Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 588, 189 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1959)
(award for parasthesias was reversed, when it was found that claimant quit work 4 years
after condition of her fingers and thumb, involving abnormal sensitivity without
objective cause allegedly due to using snippers and screwdrivers, had been pronounced
cured).
Oklahoma: Ada Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Snead, 364 P.2d 696 (Okla. 1961)
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(when an employee is industrially injured (herniated disc) and then "worries himself into
a heart attack [3 years later] because his disability makes it impossible for him to work
and provide for his family," the connection to causal relationship is too remote and
uncertain).
Rhode Island: Quillen v. O.D. Purington Co., 89 R.I. 165, 94 A.2d 247 (1953)
(denial of compensation affirmed since medical evidence was conflicting as to causation
between fall and headaches).
Washington: Berndt v. Department of Labor& Indus., 44 Wash. 2d 138,265 P.2d
1037 (1954) (compensation denied to widow who asserted that death of her husband from
coronary thrombosis was caused by fear that she would consider employment dermatitis
to be a venereal disease).
Wisconsin: Miller Rasmussen Ice & Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 263 Wis.
538, 57 N.W.2d 736 (1953) (award reversed for failure to show trauma caused neurosis).
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Appendix IV
Following is a listing, by jurisdiction, of case law on the issue of compensation for
"nervous" injuries caused by nervous or mental stimuli.
A.

Cases A warding Compensation

Federal: American Nat'l Red Cross v. Hagen, 327 F.2d 559 (7th Cir. 1964)
(compensation awarded to claimant whose acute paranoid schizophrenic reaction was
found to have been causally related to the stresses of his job as a Red Cross worker, his
location in Japan, personnel problems, extra work during his superior's illness, and a
conflict with the local military chaplain over who was to advise servicemen of death in
their families); In re John T. Wade, No. 61-122 (Employee's Compensation App. Bd.
May 9, 1961) (remand for the taking of further psychiatric evidence as to the validity of
depressive reaction allegedly due to severe emotional strain of deputy head of a supply
division).
Florida: Lyng v. Rao, 72 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1954) (although her injuries were not
outwardly visible, a stenographer who was hospitalized for about 2 months for chest
pains after her building had been struck by lightning while she was typing with her feet
in water because the roof leaked was awarded compensation). Contra,City Ice & Fuel
Div. v. Smith, 56 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1952) (compensation denied trucker who was
sideswiped without physical injury, but who a day later suffered from emotional shock).
Michigan: Carter v. GMC, 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960) (worry over
not being able to keep up with assembly line triggered a psychosis).
New Jersey: Simon v. R.H.H. Steel Laundry, 25 N.J. Super. 50, 95 A.2d 446
(Hudson County Ct. L. Div.), affid, 26 N.J. Super. 598, 98 A.2d 604 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1953) (no physical disability; but complete psychoneurotic disability following
explosion of steel pipe was compensable). Contra, Voss v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, 14 N.J. Misc. 791, 187 A. 334 (Workmen's Comp. Bur. 1936) (holding that
a stenographer who underwent a disabling nervous spell caused by a co-worker who
called her an "idiot" did not suffer accidental injury).
Oregon: Kinney v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 245 Ore. 543,423 P.2d 186
(1967) (dictum).
Texas: Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955),
noted in 53 MICH. L. REv. 898 (1955) (discussed in text accompanying note 53 supra); cf
Frazier v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 368 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) (gradual
increase in mental tensions resulting in the claimant's suffering spasmodic torticollis
(stiff neck) which reached a climax on a given date was not an injury under the
compensation act, but was an occupational disease).
Virginia: Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (1941).
England: Yates v. South Kirkby & Collieries, Ltd., [1910] 2 K.B. 538 (nervous
collapse on seeing co-worker maimed).
B.

Cases Denying Compensation

Georgia: Brady v. Royal Mfg. Co., 117 Ga. App. 312, 160 S.E.2d 424 (1968)
(because of absence of "accident," compensation was denied to claimant who was
caused to become emotionally upset while at work and suffered a conversion reaction
resulting in loss of use of her arm).
Kansas: Jacobs v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 196 Kan. 613, 412 P.2d 986
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(1966) (compensation denied to claimant whose disability was due to a mental illness
brought about by his attempts to meet a quota).
Louisiana: Johnson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 196 So. 2d 635 (La. 3d
Cir. Ct. App. 1967) (claimant's total disability from a nervous breakdown caused by
work pressures and fatigue was held not to be compensable for lack of a physical incident
as a causative or contributory factor); Hackett v. Travelers Ins. Co., 195 So. 2d 758 (La.
3d Cir. Ct. App. 1967) (compensation denied to claimant who became disabled as a
result of a psychological problem that developed after 2 men he was working with were
killed in a dynamite blast).
Nebraska: Bekeleski v. O.F. Neal Co., 141 Neb. 657,4 N.W.2d 741 (1942) (shock
of elevator operator from seeing passenger killed). Note, however, that Nebraska has the
"violence to physical structure" type of statute.
New York: Straws v. Fail, 17 App. Div. 2d 998, 233 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1962)
(discussed in text accompanying note 55 supra).
Pennsylvania: Liscio v. S. Makransky & Sons, 147 Pa. Super. 483, 24 A.2d 136
(1942) (recovery denied for shock as result of flash of lightning).
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Appendix V
Following is a listing, by jurisdiction, of case law on the issue of compensation
neurosis.
A.

Cases Awarding Compensation

Louisiana: Doucet v. Ashy Constr. Co., 134 So. 2d 665 (La. 3d Cir. Ct. App.
1961) (claimant's back injury aggravated a preexisting neurosis).
Minnesota: Welchlin v. Fairmont Ry. Motors, 180 Minn. 411, 230 N.W. 897
(1930).
New Mexico: In Ross v. Sayers Well Serv. Co., 76 N.M. 321,414 P.2d 679
(1966), one psychiatrist could not express an opinion whether the claimant's disability
was due to work-connected psychiatric problems. The other psychiatrist stated that
disability was due to compensation neurosis. A finding of no compensable disability was
reversed, and compensation was awarded.
New York: Rodrigues v. New York Dock Co., 256 App. Div. 875, 9 N.Y.S.2d
264, motion for leave to appeal denied, 280 N.Y. 852, 20 N.E.2d 398 (1939) (dementia

praecox in part caused by compensation worry).
Texas: Hood v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 522,209 S.W.2d 345 (1948); cf
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Ham, 333 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (the jury
rejected medical testimony that the claimant's "glove and stocking anesthesia" was the
result of psychoneurotic emotional stress caused by the litigation and found the disability
was caused solely by the physical injuries); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Hatton, 252
S.W.2d 754 (rex. Civ. App. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 152 Tex. 199, 255 S.W.2d
848 (1953). Medical witnesses called by the defendant testified that the plaintiff was
suffering from hysteria or neurosis as a result of the injury and pendency of the suit
which would probably improve after the termination of the litigation. Since no pleading
covered such disability, plaintiff sought and was granted permission to set it up in a trial
amendment. The court ruled that such disability may be considered by the jury and is
compensable.
Washington: Peterson v. Department of Labor & Indus., 178 Wash. 15, 33 P.2d
650 (1934).
Wisconsin: In Gallagher v. Industrial Comm'n, 9 Wis. 2d 361, 101 N.W.2d 72
(1960), conflicting medical testimony indicated either no disability from the claimant's
accident or 90% temporary disability caused by a compensation neurosis classified
specifically as a conversion reaction. Based upon a doctor's opinion that the neurosis
would disappear in one year, the Commission's award of 5% permanent disability in
order to provide benefits for 50 weeks was affirmed.
B.

Cases Denying Compensation

Connecticut: Kowalski v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 116 Conn. 229, 164 A. 653
(1933).
Georgia: Swift & Co. v. Ware, 53 Ga. App. 500, 186 S.E. 452 (1963).
Rhode Island: Martino v. California Artificial Flower Co., 91 R.I. 91, 161 A.2d
193 (1960) (additional compensation benefits were denied when the cause of disability
was attributed to compensation neurosis).
Florida: The Florida cases are interesting but inconclusive on the main principle.
In Moses v. R.H. Wright & Son, 90 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1956), the claimant suffered an
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electric shock while working. Because of his illiteracy and a peculiar spiritual
philosophy, he thereafter labored under a disabling mental condition or psychosis. He
believed that the electric shock was a supernatural warning or punishment. He
interpreted it as an act of God indicating the displeasure of the Lord. His condition did
not result from anxiety over the litigation but from his strange concepts. Here there was
more than compensation neurosis, because settlement to him would merely mean that
God had overthrown the devil. Compensation was awarded. In Tolbert v. Truly Nolen,
Inc., 148 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1963), compensation neurosis and residual emotional
disability, rated at 35% loss of wage earning capacity, following accident were not
compensable when Negro claimant was motivated by a religion (Temple Islam) that,
according to the opinion, teaches members to fight and deceive the white man. In Maffitt
v. Henderson's Portion-Pak, Inc., 132 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1961), a psychiatrist testified that
the claimant's compensation neurosis would exist as long as she was receiving temporary
disability benefits. The Deputy Commissioner awarded a lump sum settlement to provide
for medical treatment and to facilitate the cure. The court held that medical treatments
must be furnished by the employer, but not by awarding a lump sum payment to the
claimant to be used for medical treatment expenses. Additional compensation benefits
were denied on other grounds.
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Appendix VI
Following is a listing, by jurisdictions, of decisions concerning the issue of
malingering.
Arizona: Minton v. Industrial Comm'n, 90 Ariz. 254, 367 P.2d 274 (1961)
(although the claimant contended that psychoneurotic factors should be determined on
the basis of legal cause and effect rather than medical cause following an injury, the
expert witness, a specialist in neuropsychiatry, testified that no psychiatric disability was
attributable to the accident; compensation based on neurosis was denied); Davidson v.
Induistrial Comm'n, 72 Ariz. 314, 235 P.2d 1007 (1951) (a defeatist and apathetic
attitude falling short of a neurosis is not a ground for finding one who has done no work
since his injury totally and permanently disabled).
Delaware: Whaley v. Shellady, Inc., 52 Del.519,161 A.2d422 (1960) (based upon
evidence that the claimant "was at no time anxious to work," but was capable of
shooting pool several times a week and going surf fishing, the court affirmed a reduction
in total disability benefits to partial disability for a back injury).
Florida: Johnny's Welding Shop v. Eagan, 143 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1962).
Louisiana: Lyons v. Maryland Cas. Co., 158 So. 2d 392 (La. 3d Cir. Ct. App.
1963) (claim based upon disabling psychoneurosis denied); Mouton v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
135 So. 2d 287 (La. 3d Cir. Ct. App. 1961) (the court affirmed the denial of
compensation restating extensive portions of medical testimony concerning claimant's
alleged back injury and post-traumatic neurosis that could not be reconciled with his
activities of plowing with a tractor and cultivating a cotton field with mules, and with his
general reputation which fell short of his being known as a hard worker); Kenny v.
Schuylkill Prods. Co., 130 So. 2d 696 (La. 1st Cir. Ct. App. 1961) (the claimant suffered
third-degree bums in February, underwent a skin graft operation in March, and was
found to be suffering merely from "compensationitis" by April 7, 1959). In Washington
.v. Quality Constr. Co., 124 So. 2d 151 (La. 4th Cir. Ct. App. 1960), the claimantemployee received a favorablejudgment for workmen's compensation for post-traumatic
neurosis that he claimed rendered him totally and permanently disabled. In spite of a
disagreement between psychiatrists, the evidence was found to show a determination on
the part of the employee to bolster his case with false statements and actions, indicating
that he was a malingerer. Judgment was therefore reversed and the suit dismissed.
Mississippi: International Paper Co. v. Wilson, 243 Miss. 659, 139 So. 2d 644
(1962) (claim for neurotic disability, or alternatively for conversion reaction disability,
denied).
New York: Kalendowich v. Detecto Scales, 9 App. Div. 2d 979, 198 N.Y.S.2d 356
(1959) (although medical experts testified to the existence of neurosis following a back
injury, the Board denied compensation on a finding of no causal relation between the two
and a strong inference of malingering).
Wisconsin: The opinion in Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n, 14 Wis. 2d 211, 109
N.W.2d 666 (1961) and that in a previous appeal, 5 Wis. 2d 584, 93 N.W2d 439 (1958),
indicate the thin line between traumatic neurosis and malingering and enunciate the
evidence necessary to sustain an award for the former. The court came to the conclusion
that the claimant grossly exaggerated his ailments, that the medical evidence was
inadequate, and that the claimant had received benefits in excess of his actual physical
disabilities to such an extent that the denial of further benefits was not reversible error in
any event. Compensation for neurotic disability was denied.

